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Abstract—Homomorphic encryption aims at allowing compu-
tations on encrypted data without decryption other than that of
the final result. This could provide an elegant solution to the
issue of privacy preservation in data-based applications, such
as those using machine learning, but several open issues hamper
this plan. In this work we assess the possibility for homomorphic
encryption to fully implement its program without relying on
other techniques, such as multiparty computation (SMPC), which
may be impossible in many use cases (for instance due to the high
level of communication required). We proceed in two steps: i) on
the basis of the structured program theorem [Bohm, Jacopini]
we identify the relevant minimal set of operations homomorphic
encryption must be able to perform to implement any algorithm;
and ii) we analyse the possibility to solve -and propose an
implementation for- the most fundamentally relevant issue as
it emerges from our analysis, that is, the implementation of
conditionals (requiring comparison and selection/jump opera-
tions). We show how this issue clashes with the fundamental
requirements of homomorphic encryption and could represent
a drawback for its use as a complete solution for privacy
preservation in data-based applications, in particular machine
learning. Our approach for comparisons is novel and entirely
embedded in homomorphic encryption, while previous studies
relied on other techniques, such as SMPC, demanding high level
of communication among parties, and decryption of intermediate
results from data-owners. A number of studies have indeed
dealt with comparisons, but typically their algorithms rely on
other techniques, such as secure multiparty computation, which
required a) high level of communication among parties, and b)
the data owner to decrypt intermediate results. Our protocol is
also provably safe (sharing the same safety as the homomorphic
encryption schemes), differently from other techniques such as
Order-Preserving/Revealing-Encryption (OPE/ORE).
Index Terms—homomorphic encryption, machine learning
I. INTRODUCTION
Machine learning, data mining and predictive data analytics
represent an ensemble of techniques and algorithms (which
for simplicity we will in the following indicate simply as
”machine learning”) that allow systems to act and make
predictions without being explicitly programmed in full detail
to do so, but by leveraging their input data with inference
techniques. They have nowadays an overwhelming number of
practical applications providing us with an unprecedented level
of comfort and services, from tailored suggestion systems, to
“personalised medicine”, and several other services.
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However, these advantages typically come at the price of
loosing individual privacy, as personal or valuable information
is used by the algorithms and the third parties operating them.
This issue has spawn research activity at different levels.
Very roughly speaking we can divide the developed privacy-
preservation techniques in two classes: those that work by
modifying the data themselves and those that modify the
representation of the data, but not the actual data content.
Techniques of the first class act on the datasets holding the
privacy-concerned data and can be divided in a few subclasses
[2]. Common to all of them is the distinction between iden-
tifier, quasi-identifier and anonymous data. Such techniques
require only comparatively minor (conceptual) changes to
the application algorithms acting on the data, but they have
significant drawbacks. Indeed, they impose a trade-off between
the degree of preserved privacy and the usefulness of the data:
a “privacy budget”, which has been shown to be quite limited
[28]. Moreover, such techniques appear to be beatable by the
algorithms themselves and database crossing attacks (that is,
the use by an attacker of other, public or stolen, databases to
“complete” or infer the relevant distorted information in the
database of interest) [28].
The other class of techniques has been proposed within
cryptography. Among the different research lines we recall: se-
cure multi-party computation, functional encryption, program
obfuscation and homomorphic encryption, see for instance [7],
[12], [29], [56]. These approaches differ in several aspects,
including the set of functions that can be computed on the
encrypted data and stage of development.
Homomorphic encryption aims at enabling the computation
of arbitrary (in the case of fully homomorphic encryption) or
classes (in the case of partial homomorphic encryption) of
functions on encrypted data without having the need to decrypt
them first and limiting decryption to the very final result
only. This is in particular interesting for privacy preservation
(including algorithm protection) in learning applications, and
has been actively pursued in the latest years, e.g [6], [13],
[14], [32], [35]. However, several open issues make homo-
morphic cryptosystems still unsuited for the vast majority of
machine learning algorithms. Those that have been identified
in the literature mainly are: memory footprint, computational
complexity, limited representable data (only integers and fi-
nite precision floats) and a restricted set of operations (only
polynomial operations, that is addition and multiplication).
Such problems can however be divided into two classes.
The first class comprises issues such as the memory footprint
and the computational complexity, which could be hoped to
be trivially solved by technological (hardware) advancements,
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2similarly to what has happened in deep learning. On the
other hand, the second class of the above-listed problems, like
the limited types of representable data and the lack of more
general operations, must find a solution at the theoretical and
cryptography level. It is this second class of issues that we are
interested in within this work.
We therefore individuate and analyse the minimum set of
basic operations necessary to implement any algorithm, what-
ever its complexity, and assess the possibility/impossibility
to implement them in homomorphic encryption from first
principles.
We proceed on the basis of the well-known structured
program theorem [9], which states that every computable
function1 can be implemented in a programming language that
combines subprograms in only three specific ways:
1) Executing one subprogram, and then another subprogram
(sequence);
2) Executing one of two subprograms according to the value
of a Boolean variable (selection);
3) Executing a subprogram until a Boolean variable is true
(iteration).
We observe that 2) and 3) require being able to perform con-
ditionals, that is comparison operations to compare values and
evaluate down to a single Boolean value, and selection/jump
operations to pick up the correct branch of a program. Hence
in order to assess the possibility for homomorphic encryp-
tion to accommodate all algorithms (in particular machine
learning ones), comparisons and selections/jumps must be
implementable2.
In this work we address both the issue of comparison and
of selection/jump operations. Concerning the former, several
proposals have been made concerning comparison operations
in an encrypted setting, but not yet totally within an homo-
morphic cryptosystem. There is even a claim that comparison
would not be feasible in pure homomorphic encryption, see for
example the comments in [4]. Typical, well-studied approaches
have been
1) the so-called Order-Preserving-Encryption (OPE) and its
variants such as Modular-OPE and Order-Revealing-
Encryption (ORE), see for instance [3], [10], [11], [43],
[46], [48], which do not belong to the homomorphic
encryption class and, more seriously, have been proven
to be not secure (for recent proofs, see for instance [8],
[36]);
2) secure multi-party computation (SMPC) (for recent works
see [22], [44]), which, although secure, require a high
level of communication between parties (each single
comparison in a machine learning training and predic-
tion process must be performed by exchanging several
messages), which may not be always possible;
3) combinations of homomorphic encryption with other
cryptographic techniques such as SMPC to perform the
1Technically, representable as a flow chart, such as all machine learning
algorithms.
2Proving the impossibility of implementing such operations, would entail
the impossibility to implement complex algorithms under homomorphic
encryption. Clearly, in the opposite case, where the fundamental analysis is
positive, one still needs to assess the effectiveness of the implementation,
which may still condemn homomorphic encryption to be impractical.
comparisons [16], [24], [41], [47], [55]. Again, these
approaches do not manage to perform the comparisons
exclusively on encrypted messages, as the data owner is
required by the protocol to decrypt intermediate results,
extract the significant bits for the comparison, re-encrypt
and send the result back to the other party for the
accomplishment of the algorithm. Such “decryption in the
middle” hampers the purpose of homomorphic encryption
(also, the need for a high level of communication between
parties due to the use of SMPC may be impossible in a
number of actual practical use cases).
In this paper we develop, through a new approach, a
technique to achieve comparisons in homomorphic encryption
(that is, with no need for communication between parties and
acting exclusively on encrypted messages with no need for
intermediate nor partial decryption).
When turning however to selection/jump operations, which
are integral elements of conditionals, and thus of practically
relevant algorithms, we will show that one hits a rather
fundamental issue in homomorphic cryptosystems, namely
the cryptographic requirement of semantic security. We will
show how a more limited form of selection/jump operations
can still be implemented, and we discuss the limitation the
above-mentioned issue imposes on the implementation of full
machine learning algorithms. In particular, this could represent
a serious drawback in using homomorphic encryption for
data analysis applications and for implementing algorithms in
general, and could force to revisit (or abandon) that plan in
its more ambitious formulation.
The article is organised as follows: we provide a brief intro-
duction to homomorphic encryption in Section II, after which
we study comparisons and selections in a homomorphic setting
in Section IV. In Section V we present our methodology
and test results. We finally discuss applications to machine
learning in Sections VI, VI-A, where we highlight and provide
precise and exhaustive examples of how the fundamental,
general issues of homomorphic encryption that our analysis
has revealed impact the program of implementing machine
learning algorithms in such framework. In our conclusions
we also briefly touch upon the consequences of our work in
applications different than machine learning.
II. HOMOMORPHIC ENCRYPTION
A cryptosystem consists of three sets, a plaintext P , cipher-
text C and key space K, together with a family of encryption
functions Encr : K × P → C and decryption functions
Decr : K × C → P such that for each k ∈ K, there exists
a k′ ∈ K such that Decr(k′,Encr(k, p)) = p for all p ∈ P .
Although in the literature Encr is called encryption function,
it is not exactly a function in the strict mathematical sense
for most of the encryption schemes, because an element of
(pseudo)randomness is involved such that applying it more
than one time to the same key and plaintext, one obtains
different ciphertexts. Such probabilistic encryption schemes
3are favoured because they provide semantic security3, which
is equivalent to ciphertext indistinguishability4 [33], [34]. This
required randomness has a huge relevance in homomorphic
encryption, as we will see.
Encryption schemes are further distinguished by the relation
between the encryption and decryption key. If the decryption
key can be easily computed from the encryption one (in
the typical case they are in fact identical), one speaks of
a symmetric cryptosystem, while if not, one speaks of an
asymmetric cryptosystem. Typical asymmetric systems also
distinguish between public (for encryption) and private (for
decryption) keys kp, ks.
In modern cryptanalysis the adversaries are conceived as
having finite computational resources and a cryptosystem is
considered secure if its breaking is unfeasible with attack
algorithms that are probabilistic in nature and running in
polynomial time. The running of the cryptosystems functions
and adversary algorithms are all measured as a function
of the so-called security parameter λ, which measures the
complexity of the computational problem.
A cryptosystem is homomorphic for an operation ∗ acting
on P if there is a corresponding operation ◦ acting on C with
Decr(ks,Encr(kp,m1) ◦ Encr(kp,m2)) = m1 ∗m2 (1)
for m1,m2 ∈ P .
Note this is not in general a true group homomorphism, as
Encr(kp,m1) ◦ Encr(kp,m2)) 6= Encr(kp,m1 ∗m2). (2)
due to the (pseudo)randomness of the encryption scheme.
However, while mathematically this lack of identity holds,
there is a strong definition of homomorphic cryptosystems that
reconciles with the group-homomorphism-like identity, in the
statistical or computational senses, see [39].
Defining a homomorphic encryption system
(P,C,K,Encr,Decr,Ev) then consists of specifying the
evaluation function Ev that performs the homomorphically
preserved operations O on (a number of) ciphertexts
Ev : Cn × C ×K → C : (~c,O, pk)→ c′ (3)
where C is the family of circuits that the homomorphic
cryptosystem can evaluate. An homomorphic cryptosystem is
defined correct if it correctly decrypts ciphertexts both coming
from a circuit evaluation (sometimes called “evaluated cipher-
texts”), and from direct encryption of a plaintext (also dubbed
“fresh ciphertexts”). Trivial homomorphic cryptosystems are
excluded by requiring strong homomorphicity and compact-
ness for the cryptosystems, for which we refer the reader to
[39]. We will consider exclusively non-trivial homomorphic
cryptosystems.
Homomorphic cryptosystem can be further distinguished in
3The fact that no polynomial time probabilistic algorithm can derive
information about a plaintext m given its length, ciphertext and encryption
algorithm, more than any other polynomial time probabilistic algorithm that
has no access to the ciphertext.
4Given two plaintexts chosen by the adversary and the ciphertext of one of
them chosen by us, the adversary cannot distinguish which of the plaintexts
has been encrypted with a probability (significantly) larger than 1/2, see [27].
• partially homomorphic: allow only one type of operation
(addition or multiplication) for an unlimited number of
times,
• somewhat homomorphic: allow addition and multiplica-
tion, but only for a limited number of times (the size of
the ciphertext depends on the circuit depth),
• levelled homomorphic: allow addition and multiplication,
but only for a limited number of times specified as an
input parameter (here the size of the ciphertext does not
depend on the maximal allowed circuit depth, but the size
of the public key does),
• fully homomorphic allow addition and multiplication for
an unlimited number of times, and thus arbitrary functions
expressible as arithmetic circuits.
The randomness necessary for semantically secure schemes
introduces a noise component that increases with each eval-
uation of an operation in the circuit. When the noise is
above a certain limit, decryption is no longer correct. Fully
homomorphic systems, as constructed first by Gentry, see
[30], can cope with this issue thanks to a procedure, called
bootstrapping that allows to extend specific somewhat ho-
momorphic cryptosystems (called bootstrappable) to systems
where unlimited number of operation evaluations are possible.
Later realisations are, for example, [17], [21], [25], [31], [45],
[53], [54]. For the purpose of this work, it is important to
note that the increase in noise is different for addition and
multiplication. Typically the one induced by multiplications is
much larger.
Moreover, and quite relevantly, in practical applications the
computational complexity (and hence slowness) of homomor-
phic operations has prompted to use levelled homomorphic
systems. This clearly affects the algorithms that can be suc-
cessfully implemented at the practical level.
III. APPROXIMATION BY POLYNOMIALS
By definition, somewhat, levelled and fully homomorphic
encryption can only deal with polynomial operations, as they
are the operations modelled by circuits of addition and multi-
plication. Therefore one takes the approach to approximate the
functions one would like to evaluate homomorphically, with
polynomials, e.g. see [40].
For the convenience of the reader, we report here some
fundamental elements of the theory of polynomial approxima-
tions, which will be relevant in the following. It is well-known
by the Weierstrass Approximation Theorem (see e.g. [51]) that
any real-valued continuous function f on a closed interval
[a, b] ⊂ R can be uniformly approximated by a polynomial,
i.e. for every  > 0 there exists a polynomial p such that for
all x ∈ [a, b], |f(x)−p(x)| <  or equivalently ||f−p||∞ < ,
where
||f ||∞ = sup{|f(x)| : x ∈ [a, b]} = max{|f(x)| : x ∈ [a, b]},
the supremum norm. Moreover, there exists a unique polyno-
mial of degree n that minimizes the supremum norm within
the set of all polynomials of degree n, which is called the
polynomial of best approximation or minimax polynomial of
degree n. Being able to restrict the degree and to have control
4over the maximum error makes this type of approximation very
attractive. However, as the supremum norm is not induced
by an inner product, the theory of orthogonal projections
cannot be applied, but luckily there exist several (numerical)
algorithms, such as the classical [49], that can determine the
minimax polynomial.
IV. CONDITIONALS AND COMPARISONS IN
HOMOMORPHIC CRYPTOSYSTEMS
Homomorphic encryption aims at computing any com-
putable function on encrypted data without recurring to in-
termediate, not even partial, decryption, and it has been
highly regarded as a possibility to make privacy-safe machine
learning algorithms. As mentioned in the introduction, ho-
momorphic encryption allows to compute general polynomial
operations, but in order to apply homomorphic encryption at
least conceptually to general algorithms one still needs to
prove, on the basis of the structured program theorem, that
it can provide for comparisons as well as selections, the two
fundamental components of conditionals.
We will take a completely novel approach and show that
some of the involved aspects pose rather crucial problems for
the program of homomorphic encryption. Along the line of
our proposed solution to implement comparisons and selec-
tions/jumps, we will also have to deal with other open issues
in homomorphic encryption, such as the ability to perform
divisions among ciphertexts.
A. Implementing Comparison Operations in Homomorphic
Cryptosystems
We start by defining a comparison operation as a map
Comp : C × C → S = {0,±1} (4)
where C is the ciphertext space. We tackle the problem by
trying to find a representation of this map in terms of elements
of the circuit family that the homomorphic cryptosystem
can evaluate, i.e. polynomial operations, rather than trying
to implement comparisons via additional basic/elementary
features of our cryptosystem (as attempted in OPE/ORE, and
so far inconclusive). However, Comp is not straightforwardly
representable in terms of polynomials as it is discontinuous
and typically implemented as a sign or equivalently using the
Heaviside (step) function5,
H(x) =

1 if x > 1
1
2 if x = 0
0 if x < 0.
Note that H(x) = 12 (1 + sgn(x)).
Indeed, as H is discontinuous, the Weierstrass Approxima-
tion Theorem does not apply and insisting on such an approxi-
mation requires using many polynomials of high degree, while
the approximations are still of bad quality because of Gibb’s
phenomenon. As high polynomial order implies a high number
of consecutive multiplications in the homomorphic system,
5We use the half-maximum convention.
this is problematic for the levelled or somewhat homomorphic
schemes to which one is limited in practice as we have
explained before.
We can however cope with these relevant issues and obtain
a satisfactory definition and modelling.
Solution to the problem. We propose our solution, allowing:
1) to use only polynomial operations, 2) to compute compar-
isons in an efficient way in pure homomorphic encryption.
As we have remarked, Comp is typically implemented, as
a sign or Heaviside function. Note that these are distributions,
also called generalized functions6, and this allows us to base
our solution on the representation of distributions as the weak
limit of sequences of locally integrable functions. This has the
advantage that we can select suitable locally integrable func-
tions admitting more convenient polynomial approximations
that are amenable to homomorphic encryption.
Performing the weak limit is on the other hand problematic
in the homomorphic encryption setting and in general when
using (polynomial) approximations, which are typically de-
fined only over restricted intervals. We will solve this problem
by selecting a class of locally integrable functions that have
specific and suitable characteristics enabling us to calculate
such limit in a sufficiently accurate way by mapping the
values calculated over the restricted interval(s) to values at
points outside such interval(s). A key-point will be keeping
the number of consecutive operations sufficiently small (thus
also keeping the necessary polynomials to be of a low degree).
After this general introduction to our solution, we now pass
to its concrete illustration, in three key points hereby described
in 1), 2) and 3).
1) Choice of the sequence of locally integrable functions.
As we mentioned, it is well-known that H can be obtained
as the weak limit of several sequences of locally integrable
functions, but in order to effectively perform the weak limit
in homomorphic encryption with lower polynomials, we use
the sequence
{tanh(kx)}k (5)
where tanh(x) is the hyperbolic tangent, such that the weak
limit becomes
H(x) = lim
k→∞
1
2
(1 + tanh(kx)). (6)
The sequence of hyperbolic tangent functions will be crucial to
allow us to effectively compute the weak limit in homomorphic
encryption, as we will now explain.
Indeed, in homomorphic encryption we will have to poly-
nomially approximate the functions tanh(kx). The approx-
imation is necessarily only valid (that is, accurate) over a
restricted interval. In fact for performance reasons in our case,
the interval will be [0, 0.25) in order to use the lowest possible
order in polynomial approximations of the functions, as we
will explain in point 3). However, computing the weak limit
means calculating the function over large intervals defined by
z = kx, k  1. We will manage to do so precisely because of
the so-called bisection property of tanh(z), which is why such
sequence is crucial for us to be able map values calculated over
6For an introduction see [42].
5the restricted interval to values at points outside such interval
and obtain the weak limit rather efficiently (only low order
polynomials will be necessary).
2) Definition and calculation of the weak limit.
The weak limit in equation (6) requires mapping the (ap-
proximate) calculated value of tanh(z) for |z| ∈ [0, 0.25) to
much larger z, effectively z = kx, k  1 (as k →∞). In order
to do so, as mentioned, we employ the bisection property:
tanh(2z) =
2 tanh(z)
1 + tanh2(z)
. (7)
After r applications of this formula, the hyperbolic tangent
initially calculated at z = x is now calculated at z = 2rx,
hence for k = 2r the limit k  1 then corresponds to r  1.
We will discuss later on what values of r are achievable and/or
efficient in practice, and what effect this has on the accuracy
of the final comparison result.
The issue of divisions. Note that equation (7) involves
calculating a division, which is not possible in the present
homomorphic encryption schemes. We solve this issue by
using specific polynomial approximations for the function 1x ,
where x can then be generalised to functions of our cipher-
texts, once we understand how to approximate the reciprocal
function for a variable x. In the case of (7), as for all z,
0 ≤ tanh2(z) ≤ 1, we must polynomially approximate the
function 11+x for x ∈ [0, 1] with x = tanh2(z). We obtain the
approximation of such function by shifting x→ x+ 1 in the
approximation of the reciprocal function 1x for x ∈ [1, 2].
Obviously the higher the degree of the polynomial, the more
accurate is the approximation, but, as said, we have to consider
small degree polynomials because of the limitations of the
levelled homomorphic cryptosystems we have to deal with
in practice. For illustration, let us consider the two lowest
minimax approximations (which can be found for example
using the Matlab minimax algorithm):
1
x
≈ 2.871320− 3.029870x+ 1.392785x2 − 0.235498x3
(8)
1
x
≈ 1.4571− 0.5x (9)
both for x ∈ [1, 2]. The first polynomial provides a better ap-
proximation (accuracy7 µ = 9.62 bits, compared to 4.5 bits of
the second one), but its degree is unfortunately bigger making
it a less convenient candidate for homomorphic cryptosystems.
Coming back to equation (7), we thus apply x→ x+1 in the
approximation (9) of the reciprocal function 1x for x ∈ [1, 2],
which leads us to
1
1 + x
≈ 0.9571− 0.5x x ∈ [0, 1]. (10)
Hence we can write the approximate bisection formula as
tanh(2z) ≈ tanh(z)(1.9142− tanh(z)2). (11)
3) Polynomial approximation of the locally integrable
functions.
7The accuracy µ is related to the error  as µ = − log2 .
We finally address the polynomial approximation of
tanh(z) itself. Our choice for the explicit polynomial must
also be guided by the fact that we are constrained in practice
by the maximum number of consecutive operations that the
levelled homomorphic system we are limited to can sustain
before the need to bootstrap. Luckily, tanh(z) ∼ z for
|z| ∈ [0, 0.25) with already quite good accuracy (≥ 7.6 bits).
In practical applications with concrete datasets, this implies
that datapoints must be preprocessed and in particular nor-
malised such that the values we want to compare fall within
the interval [−0.12, 0.12] in order to apply the algorithms with
the above described approximation. To conclude:
Comparison Operation. For x1, x2 ∈ [−0.12, 0.12], a com-
parison operator
Comp(x1, x2) ∈ {0,±1}
can be implemented under homomorphic encryption by ap-
proximating the Heaviside function for |x| < 0.25 with
lim
r→∞
1
2
(1 + tanh(2rx))
through iteratively replacing tanh(2x) by x(1.9142− x2).
We detail the pseudocode of the comparison operation in
Algorithm 1.
B. Implementing Selection/Jump Operations in Homomor-
phic Cryptosystems
As we have mentioned above, the selection/jump operation
is particularly difficult in an homomorphic setting and this
is a crucial realisation of our analysis. Indeed, public-key
cryptography requires ciphertext indistinguishability, which is
evidently in tension with the necessity to select a path (one or
more ciphertexts) at run time, that is, before the decryption,
which is supposed to occur only at the end.
We propose, as best operational solution to this issue, an
“implicit selection” by weighting. This is in fact not an actual
selection so that it fully respects semantic security. The idea
is not to truly select, but to map the two subsets (the one of
elements we “want-to-select”, and the one of elements “not-to-
select”) into two different subspaces, choosing those spaces in
a way that this map will keep them separate in the subsequent
parts of any algorithm and will allow to recover at the end
the “want-to-select” part. This is achieved by collapsing all
elements of the “not-to-select” subset into the zero element of
the ciphertext space, while the elements that we want to select
will be preserved without change (that is, they will be mapped
in themselves). We recall that in the case of homomorphic
cryptosystems defined on polynomial rings the zero element
is the zero polynomial.
The mapping procedure consists in re-scaling the compared
data ciphertexts x1, x2 with suitable weights that depend on
the result of the comparison. There are different ways to imple-
ment such “selection” weights, differing in what comparison
operation one wants to implement (>, <, . . . ) and what are
the constraints on the number of consecutive operations.
6We now present implementations of comparison and a series
of selection operations, each of which can be realized as an
algorithm in homomorphic encryption:
Selection Operations.
Comp : C × C → {0,±1}, (x1, x2)→ w12 (12)
Select> 1
2
: C × C → C × C, (x1, x2)→ (s12x1, s21x2)
(13)
Select< 1
2
: C × C → C × C, (x1, x2)→ (s21x1, s12x2)
(14)
Select= : C × C → C × C, (x1, x2)→ (sx1, sx2) (15)
Select> : C × C → C × C, (x1, x2)→ (s˜12x1, s˜21x2)
(16)
Select< : C × C → C × C, (x1, x2)→ (s˜21x1, s˜12x2)
(17)
with
sij =
1 + wij
2
, s = 1 + w12w21,
s˜ij = wij
1 + wij
2
wij = −wji.
Note that, although w21 = −w12, it is more convenient in
the homomorphic cryptosystem scenario to calculate w12 and
w21 independently, so that they have the same (lower) noise
content, rather than w21 having a higher one due to being the
negation of w12. This will improve accuracy and precision of
the algorithms allowing more operations on the ciphertexts,
but at the expense of time efficiency.
The Select>/< 1
2
and the Select>/< algorithms differ
in how they map the case x1 = x2: the former map x1,2 →
0.5x1,2, the latter map x1,2 → 0. Note that although the former
algorithms do not implement exactly the > and < relations,
they are convenient because they use less operations, and for
some practical applications their treatment of the case x1 = x2
is not very problematic.
Finally, in Algorithm 2 we provide a detailed descrip-
tion using Select> 1
2
as an example (the algorithms for
Select>/< 1
2
and the Select>/< can be easily derived
therefrom).
We end this section with some comments on the specific
features of the mechanism we have proposed to implement the
selection operations. First of all, we stress the main difference
with an actual selection: while the latter operating on a certain
set of elements returns in general a subset of it (typically,
but of course not always, with fewer elements), our proposed
mechanisms projects the unwanted elements onto the zero
element, while preserving the elements one wants to select.
However, both the wij’s and the elements will be encrypted
in the homomorphic case, thus we will not be able to discern
which elements have been mapped to the zero element and
which have been preserved (selected). Therefore, one will have
to carry over all elements until the moment of decryption.
This clearly has implications for the efficiency of practical
applications with large datasets. We explore some of the
consequences of this in Section VI-A.
We also observe that the final obtained values sij , sij , s˜ij
will never be exactly 1 or 0, but will tend asymptotically to
Algorithm 1 Comp, encrypted version.
Input: Integer r and encrypted zc = xc1−xc2, where xc1, xc2
are encryptions of x1, x2 ∈ [−0.12, 0.12] encoded using
fractional encoder
Constants coefficient list blist = [−1.9142, 1.0, 0.5]
Output: Binary values {0, 1} with accuracy of about 3.65 bits
Algorithm
for b ∈ coefficient list blist do do
be ← Encf (b)
end for
for i = 0 to r do do
Compute: yc ← zc ∗ zc
Add plain: uc ← −1.9142e + yc
Multiply: tc ← zc ∗ uc
end for
if r%2 == 1 then
Negate: zc ← −tc
else
Assign: zc ← tc
end if
return zc = w12
Algorithm 2 Select> 1
2
, encrypted version.
Input: Integer r and xc1, xc2, which are encryptions of
x1, x2 ∈ [−0.12, 0.12] encoded using fractional encoder
Constants coefficient list blist = [−1.9142, 1.0, 0.5]
Output: Binary values {0, 1} with accuracy of about 3.65 bits
Algorithm
sij = Comp(xci, xcj ; blist) for ij = 12 and 21
Add plain: sij ← sij + 1.0e
Multiply: sij ← sij ∗ 0.5e return (s12xc1, s21xc2)
those values. An important figure of merit for the functions
we have defined is the maximum number of consecutive
operations they require, because the efficiency required in
practical applications forces us to avoid bootstrapping, and
thus allows only a limited number of consecutive operations.
We will discuss this in detail in Section V-C2.
V. TESTS AND RESULTS
A. Methodology
The general results presented in this work are agnostic for
what concerns the choice of (fully) homomorphic cryptosys-
tem. Nevertheless, to concretely implement our models and
algorithms, we have chosen to adopt the scheme of Fan and
Vercauteren (FV) [25] for a series of reasons.
a) Efficiency: the FV scheme is an efficient implementa-
tion of the scheme in [18], one of the most remarkable second
generation homomorphic systems.
b) Comprehension of the operating range for the cryp-
tosystem parameters: determining the correct operating range
of parameters for the various homomorphic cryptosystems
is one of the active topics of research and it is unclear in
all schemes. Other cryptosystems beside the Fan-Vercauteren
one have been studied under this point of view, but their
7good parameter ranges are much less clear than the already
incomplete one in Fan-Vercauteren’s, as one can for example
see mentioned and discussed in [38], see also [19] when
speaking of the popular scheme of [17]. The FV scheme has
been subject to a few more studies and experiments, as for
example can be seen in the documentation of libraries such as
SEAL [52], and [13].
c) State of software libraries: this is the point where the
FV scheme is particularly valuable, with examples such as [5],
[26], [52]. In particular, SEAL [52] is evolving towards more
explicit software engineering standards. We have been using its
version 2.1, as latest updates have implemented modifications
in the FV homomorphic scheme to improve the speed of
calculations, but making it less simple to explore suitable
ranges of parameters, see [52].
One important remark is that all libraries we know of do not
actually implement the fully homomorphic cryptosystem, be-
cause they do not implement the bootstrapping, thus reducing
the cryptosystem to only its somewhat homomorphic version.
This will effectively limit the maximum number of consecutive
operations we can evaluate.
As our work is agnostic concerning homomorphic schemes,
knowing the details of the FV one is not essential. It is however
relevant to have a picture of the scheme’s parameters, as they
affect, for instance, the size of encodable data, the size of
evaluable circuits, and so on. They are:
• the plaintext modulus t, for the plaintext space Rt ≡ Zt[x]f(x)
• the ciphertext modulus q  t, for the ciphertext space
Rq ≡ Zq [x]f(x) ,
• the degree d = 2n of the monic irreducible polynomial
modulus f(x) = xd + 1 (even degree and specific form
chosen by SEAL for efficiency reasons).
We will also encode data in plaintexts using the so-called
fractional encoding of [23], by expanding our finite precision
floats u in a basis b as u =
∑u
i=0 uib
i +
∑s
j=1 ujb
−i, with
ui, uj then mapped to plaintext polynomial coefficients. This
encoding depends on three parameters:
• the basis b,
• the number of polynomial coefficients reserved for the
fractional part nf = max allowed s,
• the number of polynomial coefficients reserved for the
integer part ni = max allowedu.
B. Datasets
As we have discussed in the introduction, only integers
and finite precision floats (that is, rational numbers) are
representable in the existing homomorphic cryptosystems. The
datasets we have been using in our analysis are random
datasets obtained from a uniform distribution of float values,
and normalised according to the specifics we will illustrate in
Sections IV-A and IV-B.
C. Empirical Study
We now turn to the empirical study of the algorithms leading
to the functions in equations (12 - 17), which all depend on
the single parameter r, the number of iterations to compute
in the weak limit approximation derived from equation (7).
We want to determine for which values of r and range of data
arguments x1, x2 the algorithm is sufficiently accurate and this
will involve studying the algorithms both in their unencrypted
and encrypted form.
The tests are run over different datasets, specified in the
respective subsections. The evaluation of the algorithm per-
formances are based on the Mean Absolute Error (MAE):
MAE(X,Y ) =
∑
y∈Y
|x− y|
|Y | (18)
where X is the set of expected values x, Y the set of
obtained ones (from the algorithms) and |Y | = |X| denotes
its cardinality.
1) Evaluation of algorithm parameters - unencrypted
form of the algorithm: We first study the algorithms in
unencrypted form to establish the dependence of the results on
r. We have considered a set Xt of samples x in the interval
|x| ∈ [0, 0.25) where the algorithms (12 - 17) can operate.
For each sample we have run the algorithm several times, for
an increasing number of iterations r, starting from r = 1.
We have then evaluated the accuracy of the algorithm in the
unencrypted form by calculating the MAE.
We present in Figure 1 a series of illustrative plots. We have
chosen to report here plots concerning Select> 1
2
(x, 0) with
little loss of generality concerning the illustrative purpose, as
those for Select>(x, 0) are quite similar, and as the algo-
rithms for the < operations are the same up to an intermediate
sign. The plots in blue (rows one and three) show the returned
results from Select> 1
2
(x, 0) against the number of iterations
r. The plots in red (row two and four) show the value of the
simple error defined as
Simple Error(x, r) = H(x)− Select> 1
2
(x, 0) (19)
where H(x) is the Heaviside function. We have chosen to plot
the results for some of the values x we have considered. In
particular we plot for points with values x going from −0.20 to
0.20 in steps of 0.05 in order to provide a consistent coverage
of the working interval of the algorithms.
We also present in Table I the values of the MAE, equa-
tion 18, for those set of values for x and for the tested
number of iterations r in the cases of Select> 1
2
(x, 0) and
Select>(x, 0). The results in the table show that, in the
former, for r = 4 the MAE has dropped at around 6%, and
for r = 5 around 3%, while in the latter the values are slightly
bigger. The low degree of the approximating polynomial from
equation (11), and thus low number of necessary consecutive
multiplications, make this an interesting result for applications
in homomorphic encryption.
2) Selection of algorithm and homomorphic scheme pa-
rameters - encrypted form of the algorithm: We move now
to a series of tests with a carefully chosen artificial dataset to
establish in the best r and FV cryptosystem parameters, where
best means leading to the smallest errors over the maximum
possible data-value interval.
The value of r determines the number of consecutive
operations the algorithms must sustain, while the parameters
8Fig. 1: Plots in rows one and three (blue color) show the value of the returned results from Select> 1
2
(z, 0) against the
number of iterations r. The plots in row two and four (red color) show the value of the simple error defined in Equation 19.
r = 1 r = 2 r = 3 r = 4 r = 5 r = 6 r = 7 r = 8
MAE(r) for Select> 1
2
0.38 0.28 0.15 0.062 0.027 0.017 0.026 0.019
MAE(r) for Select> 0.47 0.39 0.22 0.10 0.056 0.034 0.051 0.036
TABLE I: Values for the mean absolute error defined in Equation 18 for a number of iterations values r calculated over a set
of points xt = 0.05 ∗ s, −4 ≤ s ≤ 4.
of the homomorphic scheme determine the number of consec-
utive operations the encrypted algorithm can sustain without
bootstrapping. In the case of algorithms (13 - 17), the number
of (noise-dominating) consecutive multiplications we need to
be able to perform to run r iterations is
2r + 1p for the Select>/< 1
2
algorithms (20)
2r + 1 + 1p for the Select>/</= algorithms (21)
where 1p is a multiplication with a plaintext coefficient8, and
2r or 2r + 1 are ciphertext multiplications. The total count
of operations is of course higher, when including additions
and relinearizations, but as they generate less noise, we will
neglect them. Moreover, note that the ciphertext multipli-
cations involve multiplying recursively the same ciphertext,
which means that successive multiplications are more costly
for the noise growth, as they involved already noise-grown
ciphertexts.
A number of consecutive operation such as, for instance,
8+1 (for r = 4) may seem not huge, but it must be put in
8We distinguish mixed plaintext/ciphertext multiplications because the
noise level estimates are different than pure ciphertext multiplications in our
implementation based on SEAL, see Table 3 in [19].
relation with the cryptosystem parameters necessary to accom-
modate it. As said before, the analysis concerning the choice
of parameters is still an active field of research, and there are in
fact different partial results in the literature. For example [20]
estimates the cryptosystem parameters for a scheme like the
FV one, finding that already to perform 10 multiplications (of
different, and thus with minimal noise, ciphertexts) requires
a polynomial modulus degree of d = 8192 and a plaintext
modulus of at least 2243 for a fractional encoding in base
b = 3, which in turns implies a value for the ciphertext
modulus of about 2226 to have 123 bits security as estimated
in [19]. However, the work [6] claims that much higher values
are actually necessary to be able to perform 4 subsequent
multiplications, already in the case of a much simpler integer
encoding (t = 131702, q > 2159, d = 81920. Finally,
the recent paper [15] claimed necessary values of the form
t & 2107, d ≤ 368 when dealing with the case of a graph
(representing an instance of Ivakhnenko’s group method of
data handling), whose evaluation along a path from input
to output comported ≈ 6 consecutive multiplications (plus a
similar quantity of additions).
In summary, two things appear from the literature:
9• the parameter choice bounds are coarsely estimated for
similar experiments,
• the number of consecutive multiplications implemented
in existing literature is very low, thus our ∼ 8 + 1 one
appears to be the highest ever tried.
We now present the results for the algorithms,
Select>/< 1
2
and Select>/< (given the number of
operations required by these, the results also apply to the case
Select=). We have been testing with parameters ranging
over a number of possible values, in particular
d ∈ {8192, 16384, 32768}
q ∈ {2116 − 218 + 1, 2226 − 226 + 1,
2435 − 233 + 1, 2829 − 254 − 253 − 252 + 1}
t ∈ {4096, 16384, 65536}
b ∈ {3, 5, 7, 9}
nf ∈ {6, 8, 10, 24, 32}
ni ∈ {8, 16, 32, 64}
(22)
where the parameters and their notation have been defined in
Section V-A. The time of key generation and storage overhead
following from these choices of parameters are known for the
FV scheme and the SEAL implementation library, which we
have used in our tests, and we refer the reader to the literature,
see the original articles [25], [52]. We also recall, and stress,
that our algorithms are agnostic for what concerns the choice
of homomorphic scheme, and thus any performing scheme
may be used in practical applications, so that computation and
storage overheads can be tuned as desired.
The range of values for q, t, d were chosen by taking
advantage of the sets of values indicated by the SEAL team in
their testings of the library versions 2.1 and 2.2. Instead, SEAL
version 2.3.0 uses a modification of the FV scheme to increase
time efficiency, but which allow somewhat less flexibility and
“ease” in the choice of parameters. In particular, the available
values of the parameter q in version 2.3.0 have proven in our
case to yield sub-optimal results.
We have run the algorithm Comp(z, 0) over a small dataset
z ∈ {−0.20,−0.15,−0.10,−0.05, 0, 0.05, 0.10, 0.15, 0.20}
capable however to cover sufficiently uniformly the allowed
instance space |z| ∈ [0, 0.25) from Sections IV-A and IV-B.
We list in Table II the best results for each tested value of r,
where best indicates smallest MAE for the selection weights
sij , sij , s˜ij as defined in Equation (18).
From our analysis, the rationale behind the effectiveness
of encryption scheme parameters emerges as follows. First of
all we need small t and large q since qt mostly determines
the maximum noise bound, see [19]. Secondly, we need to
keep the number of coefficients reserved to the fractional
part in encoding (nf ) as small as possible because during
multiplication the number of coefficients occupied by the
fractional part will increase rapidly. The number of coefficients
reserved to the integer part (ni) is of less concern, because all
the normalised test data instances x are smaller than one.
The basis b used for the fractional encoding, see Section
V-A also played an important role. One would like to have as
small a basis as possible, to avoid the “wrapping up” of the
modulo t during computations. However, smaller basis also
means that more coefficients of the plaintext polynomial will
be non-zero, and so since the number of coefficients of the
fractional part increase with multiplications, they can more
easily cross over to the coefficients reserved for the integer
part, and ruin decryption.
Finally, the degree d of the polynomial modulus is relevant
because of two different reasons: on the one hand the experi-
ment should take into account security bounds, which depend
on d since long polynomial are more difficult to attack; on the
second hand having a big number of coefficients also helps in
avoiding that those reserved to the fractional part and those to
the integer part cross over and mix up rapidly.
3) Full tests - encrypted form of the algorithm: Having
estimated as discussed the best algorithm and scheme param-
eters, we have finally run full-fledged tests over randomised
datasets to assess the accuracy of the algorithms.
We have studied the algorithms Select> 1
2
, Select>
and Select=, since the algorithms for the < (less than)
relations are essentially the same as the ones for > up to
an (intermediate) sign, hence the test results apply to those as
well. Our datasets consisted of couples of datapoints randomly
generated in the range [−0.12, 0.12] (so that the difference
between datapoint values would fall in the valid range [0, 0.25)
to apply the algorithms, see Sections IV-A and IV-B). We have
used several measures of accuracy and performance for the
algorithms, to be able to provide a rigorous evaluation.
The results are presented in Table III. The simplified nota-
tion MAE(a) indicates the error calculated using equation (18)
on the values a = aout−aexpected. We have studied various tests,
in particular we have considered a to be first sij , sij , s˜ij and
then the final full output of the algorithms (that is, a = sijxi
and the analogous for sij , s˜ij).
The best performing algorithms are Select> 1
2
(and thus
Select< 1
2
as it is the same up to an initial sign), achieving
about 20% error on the selection weights and 2% on the final
output. The error is dominated by the error value for datapoints
that are very close to each other. In fact, we have run the same
tests with datapoints with a fixed minimal distance in order to
check variations depending on this, and the error rate drops
rapidly in function of the inter-distance of points (already with
inter-distance higher than a few percent, for instance 3%, the
error rate on selection weights drop at about 12%).
The algorithm Select= deserves a special comment: the
comparison weights wij are exactly 1 when xi = xj and
different from 1 when xi 6= xj (and closer to 0 as the
difference/distance between xi and xj is larger), so that if
in a simple application one lets the data owner simply decrypt
the comparison weights and pick the datapoints corresponding
to weights equal to 1 to perform the selection part of the
conditionals of interest, one would have perfect accuracy. This
however cannot be done when the algorithm must be inserted
in a longer pipeline of algorithms and the “selection” must be
performed on the encrypted parts and carried over to further
steps of the pipeline. The results relative to Select= that we
show in Table III are therefore to be intended for this case.
We finally present in Table IV the result for the timing of
10
Iterations Results
r = 3
Smallest parameters where result still achieved:
d = 16384, q = 2435 − 233 + 1, t = 65536, b = 7, ni = 8, nf = 8
r = 4
Not accomplished correctly (error less than 1 at least)
by any parameter value in 22. “Best results” for
d = 16384, q = 2435 − 233 + 1, t = 65536, b = 7, ni = 8, nf = 8
TABLE II: Values for the mean absolute error defined in Equation 18 for a number of iterations values r calculated over a set
of points xt = 0.05 ∗ s, −4 ≤ s ≤ 4.
d = 16384, q = 2435 − 233 + 1, t = 65536, b = 7, ni = 8, nf = 8
Iterations Select> 1
2
Select> Select=
MAE(sij ) MAE(sijx) MAE(sij ) MAE(sijx) MAE(s˜ij ) MAE(s˜ijx)
r = 3 0.26 0.021 0.41 0.023 0.52 0.057
r = 4 1.7 0.28 4.9 0.55 2.6 0.30
TABLE III: Errors for the comparison and selection/jump algorithms defined in (12), (13), (15), (16). We have tested the
algorithms on randomly generated datasets with batches of 60 couples of datapoints to be compared and present here the
average results for r = 3, while for r = 4 we present the result for the best batch (since anyway the case r = 4 is affected by
error of decryption due to too many consecutive operations performed, see Section V.
Average timing per instance in seconds
d = 16384, q = 2435 − 233 + 1, t = 65536, b = 7, ni = 8, nf = 8
Iterations Select> 1
2
Select> Select=
r = 3 17.4 s 21.5 s 21.1 s
r = 4 30.5 s 31.5 s 31.2 s
TABLE IV: Values for the timing for runs of the selection algorithms in seconds per instance.
the selection/jump algorithm. Our work has not focused on
achieving the best performance, as it has been more centred
on the proof-of-concept and the practical implementation of
the algorithms, as well as to the discussion of the novel issues
concerning homomorphic encryption and applications such
as machine learning (see Section VI-A). We have however
measured the timings when running our tests, and report in
the table the average timing per (x1, x2) instance for the
algorithms (13), (15), (16). A direct comparison with the
results reported in the literature is however not straightforward,
because:
• there are very few works implementing similarly complex
algorithms in a homomorphic cryptosystem,
• often the experiments in the literature have been per-
formed on powerful computer clusters, see e.g. [6],
• only few among the works with complex algorithms
report full algorithm timings9.
D. Improvements and comments
We have presented here above a series of algorithms to
evaluate comparisons and conditionals in homomorphic en-
cryption settings. The algorithms have been explicitly tested in
a concrete implementation of the Fan-Vercauteren encryption
scheme in a levelled form. The limitation on the total number
of consecutive operations has the strongest influence on the
accuracy of the algorithms.
Such limitations, and hence inaccuracies, would simply be
absent for an implementation in a fully homomorphic scheme,
9The others, e.g. [15], report “time per operation” such as addition, multi-
plication or encryption. However, also other routines such as relinearizations
are present and finding the overall algorithm timing is not straightforward.
or, possibly, using schemes that although limited can tolerate
a larger number of consecutive operations (we estimated 9
multiplications would already guarantee accuracy at percent
or sub percent level).
It would be also interesting to assess what effects new plain-
and ciphertext encodings such as [13] would have, possibly in
alleviating some of the accuracy loss due to crossing of the
integer and fractional parts of the standard encoder, see Section
V-C3.
VI. APPLICATIONS
A. Machine learning and specific issues
As mentioned in the introduction, part of the present interest
in homomorphic encryption stems from the potential to permit
privacy preservation to coexist with the nowadays ubiquitous
machine learning/data mining/predictive analytics10 without
incurring in the limits of the privacy/data usefulness budget
of other approaches [28].
In the literature of the past few years we can find a limited
number of implementations of machine learning algorithms11
preserving privacy combined with homomorphic cryptography
techniques, see e.g. [6], [13], [14], [32], [35].
The main problem is that very often machine learning
techniques are not amenable to homomorphic encryption due
to various limitations and it is therefore interesting to re-think
the actual machine learning algorithms.
10Again, for brevity of expression in the following we will use “machine
learning” as an umbrella term for all these different but related approaches.
11Typically for prediction only, that is having the training part all in
unencrypted form.
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1) Relevant aspects of machine learning (ML):
Developing machine learning/data mining/predictive anal-
ysis systems typically involves a series of different steps12:
training, validation, testing, prediction. The core issue is
coined as solving a “learning problem”, which comes down to
finding within a certain solution space (essentially delimited
by the inference bias) a function or generalisation thereof
that maps input data to a correctly inferred output (be it
classification or regression). To this end, the algorithm uses
the input data to assess the relevance of different hypothesis in
the solution space, building them against the available training
data, and validating and testing them against independent
pieces of data. The tested algorithm can then be used with
other data for prediction.
2) Problematic points of ML in homomorphic settings:
We will now elaborate on certain ingredients of the machine
learning inference process that clash in a particularly relevant
way with fundamental constraints of homomorphic encryption.
In a large class of machine learning algorithms two element
are paramount: the stopping criterion and heuristics.
• Stopping criterion. Typically machine learning algo-
rithms terminate when a stopping criterion is met, gener-
ally when an extremal condition is reached. This means
that the algorithm must be able to evaluate a condition
(the criterion) and select one of the options (essentially,
continue or stop) while running in its encrypted form.
In Section IV-B we explained that the selection step
conflicts with the fundamental requirement of semantic
security in (homomorphic) encryption and we proposed
a “selection by weighting” algorithm that allows mapping
the selected-for and unselected-for subsets to specific
subsets (in particular the zero element for the unselected
subset) that at decryption will provide the desired result.
The bigger problem in this case is that the “selection
by weighting” does not really signal that a selection
has been made, but all mapped results (both “selected”
and “rejected” ones) are still encrypted and carried over.
There is no way at run time to determine that the stopping
criterion has thus been met and the procedure must
be stopped, until decryption occurs. Unfortunately, and
importantly, not stopping the training of an algorithm
precisely at the stopping point does entail overfitting and
thus suboptimal learning models.
• Heuristics. In order to efficiently explore the instance
(data) and problem space, and make useful inference,
several machine learning algorithms operate heuristic
choices at run time. Again, the clash between the need to
make selections and the requirement of semantic security
of the (homomorphic) encryption pops up. Differently
from the case of the stopping criterion, here our “selection
by weighting” would not create loss of accuracy in the
algorithms, but, of course, in the case of large datasets
it would entail carrying over the full dataset all along,
hence affecting the efficiency of the algorithm, and in
12Not always: for example instance-based methods, such as k-nearest
neighbours, do not need an actual training, validation and testing phase.
certain cases its whole inference capabilities, as we will
discuss at the end of this section.
Also another issue can arise: the comparison weights wij
are not exactly 1 or 0 but some other numbers (float)
close to that, because of the limitations in the number
of consecutive operations of the levelled homomorphic
system one has to use in practice, which limits the value
of the algorithm parameter r and thus its accuracy. This
effectively transforms a machine learning algorithm into
a weighted version of itself. In some cases this does not
significantly affect the accuracy, sensitivity and precision
of the algorithms, but in other cases it does, also in an
adverse way. The studies in this respect are scarce in the
literature, see e.g. [1] for what concerns clustering.
The two issues here presented are quite fundamental and
could seriously complicate, if not make impossible, the im-
plementation of privacy-preserving machine learning using
purely homomorphic encryption. The stopping criterion issue,
in particular, implies that the training of correctly performing
algorithms (that is, not overfitted ones) does not seem achiev-
able without decryption at run time, which goes against the
aim itself of homomorphic encryption. While this drawback
affects only the training of models, private data are also used in
training (even more than in the prediction runs after training)
and should therefore be protected as well.
The heuristics issue instead seems to represent a secondary
problem, only affecting performance and thus possibly solved
by, for example, hardware evolution. However, that is not the
case. To be able to make actual inferences several machine
learning algorithms do need to operate with heuristics on the
data/problem space. If that is not possible, the algorithms can-
not proceed with meaningful inferences. Again, this appears
to be a relevant obstacle on the road to make machine learning
privacy-friendly by using homomorphic encryption.
B. Applications to algorithms different than machine learning
Algorithms different from machine learning or similar pre-
dictive analytic techniques that do not need to make inferences
and avoid overfitting as discussed in the previous section,
are not in such a relevant clash on general grounds with
homomorphic encryption.
This means that operations such as pure database searches,
for instance, even including comparisons, conditionals and
selections could be effectively performed taking advantage of
the techniques and algorithms we have developed in this work
and their future improvements.
VII. CONCLUSIONS
Homomorphic encryption provides in theory an elegant
solution to the problem of privacy preservation in data-based
applications, such as those provided and/or facilitated by
machine learning techniques, but several limitations hamper its
implementation. In this work we have identified, on the basis
of the structured program theorem, the set of minimal opera-
tions that guarantee the computation of any computable func-
tion or algorithm. We have then focused on those that are still
lacking in homomorphic encryption, namely comparisons and
12
conditional selections. We have discovered rather fundamental
clashes between the necessity to implement those operations
and the basic requirements of (homomorphic) encryption.
We have also proposed practical implementations for those
operations or their closest possible forms in homomorphic
encryption. The limitation on the total number of consecutive
operations, due to the use of levelled homomorphic encryption
schemes without using bootstrapping (a practical limitation
we have to face), has had the strongest influence on the
accuracy of our algorithms. Percent accuracy (and better) can
be obtained however for datapoints which are sufficiently inter-
spaced. Moreover, such limitations, and hence inaccuracy,
would not occur in a fully homomorphic scheme, or, possibly,
using schemes and/or encodings that can tolerate a larger
number of consecutive operations even if only somewhat
homomorphic (we estimate from 9 multiplications onward).
We have also analysed the specific situation arising in
machine learning/predictive analytic applications. We have
pointed out at least two main sources of tension with the
use of homomorphic encryption to fully guarantee privacy
preservation in machine learning due to the newly found
above-mentioned issues. These two sources of tensions are
the stopping criterion and heuristics. They are present and
paramount in most machine learning algorithms, and clash
with (homomorphic) encryption in that they require perform-
ing selection/jump operations at run time, which in its turn
clashes with semantic security, as we have studied in this work.
Two options are open under this respect. On the one hand
it might be possible to find new classes and families of
learning algorithms that operate without “choices at run time”.
On the other, we could reconsider the use of homomorphic
encryption. Maybe some other technology, such as for example
functional encryption (e.g. [29]) may be capable to avoid
the need for high level of communication and intermediate
decryption of other techniques (such as secure multi-party
computation ones)? Functional encryption could allow to limit
the computations to some agreed level, while preserving the
rest of the privacy of the data or algorithm.
Note however that the class of algorithms which do not
need to make inferences and where overfitting can be avoided,
are not in conflict with the general grounds of homomorphic
encryption. We believe that further exploring the use of ho-
momorphic encryption in algorithms for privacy preservation
is paramount.
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